Vicegerent
2005-09-15 02:17:49 UTC
http://www.ticketslayer.com/index.ts_testimonials.htm
TESTIMONIALS
Bryson in Bakersfield, CA - I drive a delivery truck
in downtown Bakersfield, where the cops write traffic
tickets like no tomorrow. Ticket Slayer's material
successfully got all four of my traffic tickets
dismissed that I had gotten over a one year period.
Caprice in Honolulu, Hawaii - A customer told me about
Ticket Slayer's money back guaranteed method to get
traffic tickets dismissed. I am not quite sure yet why
your material works so well, but it certainly did for
me.
Jason in San Diego, CA - Your material worked just as
you said it would. I got my ticket dismissed without
having to say a word in Traffic Court. I had received
three traffic tickets in about eighteen months and had
two points on my driving record, when I got another
traffic ticket. I wasn't eligible for traffic school
and I would have lost my driver's license if it had
not been for Ticket Slayer. Ticket Slayer you really
saved my life.
Mark in San Jose, CA - Thank you Ticket Slayer! You
saved me over $500.00 in traffic fines, not to mention
how much money you saved me on my insurance rates,
which would have gone though the roof had I lost my
case. You Common Law Traffic Ticket Default Process
worked as promised. I didn't have to say a word in
Court. The Judge called my name and said my case was
dismissed.
Nikki in Denver, CO - 'You're the Bomb' Ticket Slayer!
Your material worked just as you said it would. I got
my ticket dismissed without having to say a word in
Traffic Court.
Elizabeth in Trenton, NJ - Not having been to traffic
court or any other court before, I was very nervous
about the prospect of fighting my ticket in traffic
court. Just the thought of going to traffic court gave
me an anxiety attack so; I had made up my mind to just
pay the ticket. I really didn't want to especially
because I really didn't deserve the ticket and the cop
was such a jerk.
I told Stacie, a co-worker that I was going down to
the courthouse on my lunch hour to pay my traffic
ticket and asked her if she could cover for me if I
were late getting back to work. Stacie told me she had
recently gotten a traffic ticket and found this
company on the internet called TicketSlayer.com to
beat her traffic ticket and because of the way their
legal process works she didn't have to say a word in
court. Stacie practically insisted that I use Ticket
Slayer for my traffic ticket. I am happy to say that I
got my ticket dismissed using your legal material
without having to say a word in traffic court just
like Stacie did.
I can't thank Stacie, my friend and co-worker and
Ticket Slayer enough for what you did for me. Not only
that, Ticket Slayer you revealed to me the whole fraud
behind the system, for which I will be forever
grateful to you. I now tell everyone I know about
Ticket Slayer.
Steve in Atlanta, GA - When I got to traffic court the
citing officer was sitting in back of the courtroom,
so I knew there was a good chance that the judge may
not have read the legal documents I had filed. Because
TicketSlayer had prepared me with what to do in this
situation I didn't get all panicky. I just read back
over the instruction TicketSlayer provided me with to
prepare me with on how to handle the judge in this
situation.
When the judge call me and the officer to the stand I
immediately asked the judge if he had read my legal
document that I had filed with the District Attorney
and the Traffic Court Clerk. The judge said he had
not. So, I asked him to please take a moment to read
through them as they were curcial to my case. He said,
OK and took some time to read though them.
After reading the papers the judge looked at me asked
me if I how I thought these documents would help my
case? I told him the District Attorney failed to
answer my Affidavit of Truth citing for one thing the
U.S. Supreme court case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins which
firmly states that I am a sovereign not subject to the
laws passed by the legislature. The law holds that
when the District Attorney failed to answer my claim
that I was a sovereign not subject to the law, then he
is in legal default and must accept my claim as the
being true. So, Your Honor, the District Attorney has
no legal grounds to prosecute me, since he by legal
default has to accept my claim as true. The District
Attorney having lost all grounds to prosecute me
leaves this court with no legal choice, but to dismiss
my case.
The judge sat there with this totally stunned look
upon his face without saying a word for what seemed
like an eternity. I know he wasn't prepared for the
answer I gave him. Finally, the judge says; sir your
case is dismissed. I knew he didn't want to pursue the
issue with me any further and just wanted me out of
his courtroom in a hurry at this point.
*******************************************************
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/64.htm
ICK WO V. HOPKINS (1886)
As early as 1820, Chinese were immigrating to
California, and by 1870 over 49,000 Chinese lived in
the state. That number increased to over 75,000 by
1880, amounting to nearly 10 percent of California's
population. Of this Chinese community, 40 percent, or
about 30,000 people, lived in the San Francisco Bay
area. Many Caucasian and Hispanic Californians did not
like this influx of Asians, and as a result both the
state as well as many localities began passing laws
that specifically discriminated against them. The
first anti-Chinese law passed was the Foreign Miner's
License Tax of 1853, which placed a special burden on
Chinese miners. The pace of these discriminatory laws
increased in the 1870s, leading to the banning of
Chinese from certain occupations and the adoption of
anti-Chinese provisions in the new state constitution
of 1877.
Because of the many restrictions on them, Chinese
tended to concentrate in particular businesses; they
constituted 97 percent of all persons working in
cigar-making in the San Francisco area, 84 percent of
the boot and shoemakers, 88 percent of the garment
manufacturers and 89 percent of the laundry workers.
Chinese did not go into the laundry business by
choice, and once there had to deal with hostile
non-Chinese customers. The general public read many
lurid stories denouncing laundries as fronts for
immoral activities such as opium smoking and
prostitution, although in truth most laundries were
small family enterprises.
A San Francisco ordinance prohibited operating a
laundry located in a wooden building without the
consent of the Board of Supervisors; laundries in
brick or stone buildings needed no comparable
approval. By itself the law seemed a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power, since the wooden
buildings were vulnerable to the many fires that
plagued San Francisco and other nineteenth-century
cities. At the time, over 95 percent of the 320
laundries in the city were located in wooden
buildings, and of these, two-thirds had Chinese
owners.
The Board of Supervisors granted permission to operate
laundries in wooden buildings to all but one of the
non-Chinese owners, but none to the 200 Chinese
applicants. Yick Wo, a Chinese alien who had operated
a laundry in the city for many years, was refused a
permit. When he continued to run the business, he was
arrested and convicted under the ordinance.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, not because
the ordinance specifically discriminated against
Chinese -- it did not -- but because it was
administered in a discriminatory fashion. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins is the first instance of the Court inferring
the existence of discrimination from data about a
law's application, a technique that would be used
again in the 1960s to strike down statutes
discriminating against African Americans
For further reading: G. Barth, Bitter Strength: A
History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850-1870
(1964); A. Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and
the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (1971); and
H.T. Shih-shan, The Chinese Experience in America
(1986).
----------------------------------------------------
YICK WO V. HOPKINS
Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court.
In the case of the petitioner, brought here by writ of
error to the Supreme Court of California, our
jurisdiction is limited to the question, whether the
plaintiff in error has been denied a right in
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States....
We are consequently constrained, at the outset, to
differ from the Supreme Court of California upon the
real meaning of the ordinances in question. That court
considered these ordinances as vesting in the board of
supervisors a not unusual discretion in granting or
withholding their assent to the use of wooden building
as laundries, to be exercised in reference to the
circumstances of each case, with a view to the
protection of the public against the dangers of fire.
We are not able to concur in that interpretation of
the power conferred upon the supervisors. There is
nothing in the ordinances which points to such a
regulation of the business of keeping and conducting
laundries. They seem intended to confer, and actually
do confer, not a discretion to be exercised upon a
consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a
naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent,
not only as to places, but as to persons. So that, if
an applicant for such consent, being in every way a
competent and qualified person, and having complied
with every reasonable condition demanded by any public
interest, should, failing to obtain the requisite
consent of the supervisors to the prosecution of his
business, apply for redress by the judicial process of
mandamus, to require the supervisors to consider and
act upon his case, it would be a sufficient answer for
them to say that the law had conferred upon them
authority to withhold their assent, without reason and
without responsibility. The power given to them is not
confided to their discretion in the legal sense of
that term, but is granted to their mere will. It is
purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance
nor restraint....
The ordinance drawn in question in the present
case...does not prescribe a rule and conditions for
the regulation of the use of property for laundry
purposes, to which all similarly situated may conform.
It allows without restriction the use for such
purposes of buildings of brick or stone; but, as to
wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those in
previous use, it divides the owners or occupiers into
two classes, not having respect to their personal
char-acter and qualifications for the business, nor
the situation and nature and adaptation of the
buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line,
on one side of which are those who are permitted to
pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of
the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that
consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.
And both classes are alike only in this, that they are
tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means
of living. The ordinance, therefore, also differs from
the not unusual case, where discretion is lodged by
law in public officers or bodies to grant or withhold
licens-es to keep taverns, or places for the sale of
spirituous liquors, and the like, when one of the
conditions is that the applicant shall be a fit person
for the exercise of the privilege, because in such
cases the fact of fitness is submitted to the
judgement of the officer, and calls for the exercise
of a discretion of a judicial nature.
The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the
proceedings of which they complain, are not less,
because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of
China....
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not
confined to the protection of citizens. It says: "Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." These provisions are
universal in their application, to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and
the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws. It is accordingly enacted by
§1977 of the Revised Statutes, that "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all law
and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other." The questions we have to consider and decide
in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as
involving the rights of every citizen of the United
States equally with those of the strangers and aliens
who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
It is contended on the part of the petitioners, that
the ordinances for violations of which they are
severely sentenced to imprisonment, are void on their
face, as being within the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and in the alternative, if not
so, that they are void by reason of their
administration, operating unequally, so as to punish
in the present petitioners what is permit-ted to
others as lawful, without any distinction of
circumstances -- an unjust and illegal discrimination,
it is claimed, which, though not made expressly by the
ordinances is made possible by them....
to the actual, and pass upon the validity of the
ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the
opportunities which their terms afford, of unequal and
unjust discrimination in their administration. For the
cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and
the facts shown establish an administration directed
so exclusively against a particular class of persons
as to warrant and require the conclusion, that,
whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities
charged with their administration, and thus
representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal
and oppressive as to amount to the practical denial by
the State of that equal protection of the laws which
is secured to the petitioners, as to all other
persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
adminis-tered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practicallyto make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution....
The present cases, as shown by the facts disclosed in
the record, are within this class. It appears that
both petitioners have complied with every requisite,
deemed by the law or by the public officers charged
with its administration, necessary for the protection
of neighboring property from fire, or as a precaution
against injury to the public health. No reason
whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is
assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on,
in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful
occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And
while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from
them and from two hundred others who have also
petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects,
eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to
carry on the same business under similar conditions.
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason
for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be
resisted, that no reason for it exists except
hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is
not justified. The discrimination is, therefore,
illegal, and the public administration which enforces
it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is,
therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged.
Source: 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
*******************************************************
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Vicegerent
TESTIMONIALS
Bryson in Bakersfield, CA - I drive a delivery truck
in downtown Bakersfield, where the cops write traffic
tickets like no tomorrow. Ticket Slayer's material
successfully got all four of my traffic tickets
dismissed that I had gotten over a one year period.
Caprice in Honolulu, Hawaii - A customer told me about
Ticket Slayer's money back guaranteed method to get
traffic tickets dismissed. I am not quite sure yet why
your material works so well, but it certainly did for
me.
Jason in San Diego, CA - Your material worked just as
you said it would. I got my ticket dismissed without
having to say a word in Traffic Court. I had received
three traffic tickets in about eighteen months and had
two points on my driving record, when I got another
traffic ticket. I wasn't eligible for traffic school
and I would have lost my driver's license if it had
not been for Ticket Slayer. Ticket Slayer you really
saved my life.
Mark in San Jose, CA - Thank you Ticket Slayer! You
saved me over $500.00 in traffic fines, not to mention
how much money you saved me on my insurance rates,
which would have gone though the roof had I lost my
case. You Common Law Traffic Ticket Default Process
worked as promised. I didn't have to say a word in
Court. The Judge called my name and said my case was
dismissed.
Nikki in Denver, CO - 'You're the Bomb' Ticket Slayer!
Your material worked just as you said it would. I got
my ticket dismissed without having to say a word in
Traffic Court.
Elizabeth in Trenton, NJ - Not having been to traffic
court or any other court before, I was very nervous
about the prospect of fighting my ticket in traffic
court. Just the thought of going to traffic court gave
me an anxiety attack so; I had made up my mind to just
pay the ticket. I really didn't want to especially
because I really didn't deserve the ticket and the cop
was such a jerk.
I told Stacie, a co-worker that I was going down to
the courthouse on my lunch hour to pay my traffic
ticket and asked her if she could cover for me if I
were late getting back to work. Stacie told me she had
recently gotten a traffic ticket and found this
company on the internet called TicketSlayer.com to
beat her traffic ticket and because of the way their
legal process works she didn't have to say a word in
court. Stacie practically insisted that I use Ticket
Slayer for my traffic ticket. I am happy to say that I
got my ticket dismissed using your legal material
without having to say a word in traffic court just
like Stacie did.
I can't thank Stacie, my friend and co-worker and
Ticket Slayer enough for what you did for me. Not only
that, Ticket Slayer you revealed to me the whole fraud
behind the system, for which I will be forever
grateful to you. I now tell everyone I know about
Ticket Slayer.
Steve in Atlanta, GA - When I got to traffic court the
citing officer was sitting in back of the courtroom,
so I knew there was a good chance that the judge may
not have read the legal documents I had filed. Because
TicketSlayer had prepared me with what to do in this
situation I didn't get all panicky. I just read back
over the instruction TicketSlayer provided me with to
prepare me with on how to handle the judge in this
situation.
When the judge call me and the officer to the stand I
immediately asked the judge if he had read my legal
document that I had filed with the District Attorney
and the Traffic Court Clerk. The judge said he had
not. So, I asked him to please take a moment to read
through them as they were curcial to my case. He said,
OK and took some time to read though them.
After reading the papers the judge looked at me asked
me if I how I thought these documents would help my
case? I told him the District Attorney failed to
answer my Affidavit of Truth citing for one thing the
U.S. Supreme court case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins which
firmly states that I am a sovereign not subject to the
laws passed by the legislature. The law holds that
when the District Attorney failed to answer my claim
that I was a sovereign not subject to the law, then he
is in legal default and must accept my claim as the
being true. So, Your Honor, the District Attorney has
no legal grounds to prosecute me, since he by legal
default has to accept my claim as true. The District
Attorney having lost all grounds to prosecute me
leaves this court with no legal choice, but to dismiss
my case.
The judge sat there with this totally stunned look
upon his face without saying a word for what seemed
like an eternity. I know he wasn't prepared for the
answer I gave him. Finally, the judge says; sir your
case is dismissed. I knew he didn't want to pursue the
issue with me any further and just wanted me out of
his courtroom in a hurry at this point.
*******************************************************
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/64.htm
ICK WO V. HOPKINS (1886)
As early as 1820, Chinese were immigrating to
California, and by 1870 over 49,000 Chinese lived in
the state. That number increased to over 75,000 by
1880, amounting to nearly 10 percent of California's
population. Of this Chinese community, 40 percent, or
about 30,000 people, lived in the San Francisco Bay
area. Many Caucasian and Hispanic Californians did not
like this influx of Asians, and as a result both the
state as well as many localities began passing laws
that specifically discriminated against them. The
first anti-Chinese law passed was the Foreign Miner's
License Tax of 1853, which placed a special burden on
Chinese miners. The pace of these discriminatory laws
increased in the 1870s, leading to the banning of
Chinese from certain occupations and the adoption of
anti-Chinese provisions in the new state constitution
of 1877.
Because of the many restrictions on them, Chinese
tended to concentrate in particular businesses; they
constituted 97 percent of all persons working in
cigar-making in the San Francisco area, 84 percent of
the boot and shoemakers, 88 percent of the garment
manufacturers and 89 percent of the laundry workers.
Chinese did not go into the laundry business by
choice, and once there had to deal with hostile
non-Chinese customers. The general public read many
lurid stories denouncing laundries as fronts for
immoral activities such as opium smoking and
prostitution, although in truth most laundries were
small family enterprises.
A San Francisco ordinance prohibited operating a
laundry located in a wooden building without the
consent of the Board of Supervisors; laundries in
brick or stone buildings needed no comparable
approval. By itself the law seemed a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power, since the wooden
buildings were vulnerable to the many fires that
plagued San Francisco and other nineteenth-century
cities. At the time, over 95 percent of the 320
laundries in the city were located in wooden
buildings, and of these, two-thirds had Chinese
owners.
The Board of Supervisors granted permission to operate
laundries in wooden buildings to all but one of the
non-Chinese owners, but none to the 200 Chinese
applicants. Yick Wo, a Chinese alien who had operated
a laundry in the city for many years, was refused a
permit. When he continued to run the business, he was
arrested and convicted under the ordinance.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, not because
the ordinance specifically discriminated against
Chinese -- it did not -- but because it was
administered in a discriminatory fashion. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins is the first instance of the Court inferring
the existence of discrimination from data about a
law's application, a technique that would be used
again in the 1960s to strike down statutes
discriminating against African Americans
For further reading: G. Barth, Bitter Strength: A
History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850-1870
(1964); A. Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and
the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (1971); and
H.T. Shih-shan, The Chinese Experience in America
(1986).
----------------------------------------------------
YICK WO V. HOPKINS
Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court.
In the case of the petitioner, brought here by writ of
error to the Supreme Court of California, our
jurisdiction is limited to the question, whether the
plaintiff in error has been denied a right in
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States....
We are consequently constrained, at the outset, to
differ from the Supreme Court of California upon the
real meaning of the ordinances in question. That court
considered these ordinances as vesting in the board of
supervisors a not unusual discretion in granting or
withholding their assent to the use of wooden building
as laundries, to be exercised in reference to the
circumstances of each case, with a view to the
protection of the public against the dangers of fire.
We are not able to concur in that interpretation of
the power conferred upon the supervisors. There is
nothing in the ordinances which points to such a
regulation of the business of keeping and conducting
laundries. They seem intended to confer, and actually
do confer, not a discretion to be exercised upon a
consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a
naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent,
not only as to places, but as to persons. So that, if
an applicant for such consent, being in every way a
competent and qualified person, and having complied
with every reasonable condition demanded by any public
interest, should, failing to obtain the requisite
consent of the supervisors to the prosecution of his
business, apply for redress by the judicial process of
mandamus, to require the supervisors to consider and
act upon his case, it would be a sufficient answer for
them to say that the law had conferred upon them
authority to withhold their assent, without reason and
without responsibility. The power given to them is not
confided to their discretion in the legal sense of
that term, but is granted to their mere will. It is
purely arbitrary, and acknowledges neither guidance
nor restraint....
The ordinance drawn in question in the present
case...does not prescribe a rule and conditions for
the regulation of the use of property for laundry
purposes, to which all similarly situated may conform.
It allows without restriction the use for such
purposes of buildings of brick or stone; but, as to
wooden buildings, constituting nearly all those in
previous use, it divides the owners or occupiers into
two classes, not having respect to their personal
char-acter and qualifications for the business, nor
the situation and nature and adaptation of the
buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary line,
on one side of which are those who are permitted to
pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of
the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that
consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.
And both classes are alike only in this, that they are
tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means
of living. The ordinance, therefore, also differs from
the not unusual case, where discretion is lodged by
law in public officers or bodies to grant or withhold
licens-es to keep taverns, or places for the sale of
spirituous liquors, and the like, when one of the
conditions is that the applicant shall be a fit person
for the exercise of the privilege, because in such
cases the fact of fitness is submitted to the
judgement of the officer, and calls for the exercise
of a discretion of a judicial nature.
The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the
proceedings of which they complain, are not less,
because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of
China....
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not
confined to the protection of citizens. It says: "Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." These provisions are
universal in their application, to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and
the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws. It is accordingly enacted by
§1977 of the Revised Statutes, that "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all law
and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other." The questions we have to consider and decide
in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as
involving the rights of every citizen of the United
States equally with those of the strangers and aliens
who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
It is contended on the part of the petitioners, that
the ordinances for violations of which they are
severely sentenced to imprisonment, are void on their
face, as being within the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and in the alternative, if not
so, that they are void by reason of their
administration, operating unequally, so as to punish
in the present petitioners what is permit-ted to
others as lawful, without any distinction of
circumstances -- an unjust and illegal discrimination,
it is claimed, which, though not made expressly by the
ordinances is made possible by them....
to the actual, and pass upon the validity of the
ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the
opportunities which their terms afford, of unequal and
unjust discrimination in their administration. For the
cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and
the facts shown establish an administration directed
so exclusively against a particular class of persons
as to warrant and require the conclusion, that,
whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities
charged with their administration, and thus
representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal
and oppressive as to amount to the practical denial by
the State of that equal protection of the laws which
is secured to the petitioners, as to all other
persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
adminis-tered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practicallyto make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution....
The present cases, as shown by the facts disclosed in
the record, are within this class. It appears that
both petitioners have complied with every requisite,
deemed by the law or by the public officers charged
with its administration, necessary for the protection
of neighboring property from fire, or as a precaution
against injury to the public health. No reason
whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is
assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on,
in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful
occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And
while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from
them and from two hundred others who have also
petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects,
eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to
carry on the same business under similar conditions.
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason
for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be
resisted, that no reason for it exists except
hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is
not justified. The discrimination is, therefore,
illegal, and the public administration which enforces
it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The imprisonment of the petitioners is,
therefore, illegal, and they must be discharged.
Source: 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
*******************************************************
See how simple it is to defeat the legal fiction scam
instituted by the Vatican thugs!!!!
Now, do the same on their income tax scam!
Learn how to file a $0.00 tax owing' CRA T1 or IRS 1040:
http://kanata.250free.com/filingT1.htm
Vicegerent